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INTRODUCTION
Providing prenatal health care for working poor and immigrant
women is a worthy goal, which the Bush Administration should strive
to meet, but the Administration’s recent regulation redefining “child”
under its State Children’s Health Insurance Program (“SCHIP”)1 to
∗ The author is a former trial attorney with the United States Department of
Justice, Civil Division, and current lecturer in the areas of law, government, public
policy, and business at the Orfalea College of Business, California Polytechnic State
University, San Luis Obispo and Cuesta College. She dedicates this article to her
children: Benjamin and Clara.
1. See State Children’s Health Insurance Program, Eligibility for Prenatal Care
and Other Health Services for Unborn Children, 67 Fed. Reg. 61,956 (Oct. 2, 2002)
[hereinafter Program] (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 457) (expanding the definition of
children covered under SCHIP to allow unborn children to be considered “targeted
low-income child[ren]”).
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include the unborn undermines the tenets of Roe v. Wade2 without
providing any tangible benefits to uninsured women and their
unborn children. This Article examines the legal, political, and
medical implications of the recent change announced by President
George W. Bush and the Department of Health and Human Services
(“HHS”) to expand its definition of child under SCHIP to begin at
conception and continue until age nineteen.3 In addition, HHS
announced that this coverage applies to all unborn children,
regardless of the pregnant woman’s immigration status.4 This change
may allow a court to find fertilized eggs, fetuses, and embryos entitled
to the status of born children and thus the entire constitutional rights
which accompany personhood without resulting in significant
increases in prenatal care for pregnant women.5
Part I provides a brief background of the SCHIP program and its
successes and failures throughout its first five years.6 Part II addresses
the potential effects of the new definition of child on legal precedents
and how it relates to the concept of child as defined by courts and
legislatures in other areas of the law.7 Part III explains how the new
definition is doomed to fail at providing prenatal care for uninsured
women and their unborn children because of SCHIP’S lack of
additional funding and also the conflict it creates between the woman
and the unborn child.8 Part IV discusses the highly charged political
climate in which the change was announced, while part V, proposes
some alternative routes the Administration could have taken to
actually provide prenatal care to uninsured poor and immigrant
women without entering the quagmire of when life begins.9 Finally,

2. 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973) (finding that unborn persons “represent only the
potentiality of life”).
3. See generally Press Release, United States Department of Health and Human
Services, HHS to Allow States to Provide SCHIP Coverage for Prenatal Care: Would
Allow Use of Existing Resources to Expand Prenatal Care Immediately (Jan. 31, 2002)
(justifying the decision to include the age of nineteen years as necessary to provide
prenatal healthcare to women).
4. See Program, supra note 1, at 61,966 (stating that the exclusion of children
from coverage based on immigrant status would be contrary to SCHIP’s purpose of
providing care to children).
5. See Dawn Miller, SCHIP Change Won’t Help State Expand Prenatal
Coverage, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Sept. 28, 2002, at 2A (commenting on SCHIP’s lack
of funding as the major impediment to expanding prenatal care). But see Program,
supra note 1, at 61,963 (arguing that regulation will allow more women to obtain
prenatal care).
6. See infra Part I.
7. See infra Part II.
8. See infra Part III.
9. See infra Part IV.
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the Article concludes that the decision to expand the definition of
child to include the unborn is a bold step into the abortion rights
controversy aimed at emboldening abortion rights opponents and
attracting Hispanic voters in an election year, and also to serve as a
step toward overturning Roe v. Wade without providing any
substantial benefits to pregnant low income and immigrant women.10
I. THE SCHIP PROGRAM
In 1997, Congress created SCHIP as part of its Balanced Budget
Act11 in a bipartisan attempt to provide health insurance coverage for
the approximately eleven million children whose families were unable
to qualify for Medicare because their family’s income was above the
Federal Poverty Level yet were unable to afford private health
insurance.12 SCHIP was enacted in response to a disturbing increase
in the number of uninsured children in families earning between
100% and 150% of the federal poverty level.13 The level of uninsured
children was deemed a serious national concern, particularly for
certain minority children.14 Early health care coverage for children is
an important public policy goal for “it impacts their ability to learn,
their ability to thrive, and their ability to become productive members
of society.”15 Thus, government officials proudly touted SCHIP as “a
landmark opportunity to improve children’s health.”16
10. See infra Part V.
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397aa-1397hh (subch. XXI) (1997) (proposing and defining
the State Children’s Health Insurance Program).
12. See id. at § 1397aa (declaring that the goal of this section is to allow states to
provide for health assistance coverage for “uninsured, low-income children”); see also
Lisa J. Andeen, Note, Improving Health Care for Uninsured Children in the Wake of
the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), 27 J. LEGIS. 299, 303-04
(2001) (noting that more than one-half of uninsured children come from families
whose incomes were above the federal poverty level); New Data: Nearly 5 Million
Children in America are Needlessly Uninsured: HHS Sec. Thompson Helps Kick Off
Enrollment Drive, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Aug. 1, 2002, available at 2002 WL 22070112
[hereinafter New Data] (quoting Senators Orrin Hatch and Edward Kennedy
regarding the importance of SCHIP).
13. See MARGO ROSENBACH ET AL., IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STATE CHILDREN’S
HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAM: MOMENTUM IS INCREASING AFTER A MODEST START, FIRST
ANNUAL REPORT 8-9 (2001) (calculating that 27.8% of children between 100% and
150% of the poverty level were uninsured between 1993 and 1997 before SCHIP was
implemented).
14. See New Data, supra note 12 (reporting that African-American and Latino
children are significantly affected by the lack of insurance).
15. Extension of Remarks at the Introduction of the MediKids Health Insurance
Act of 2000, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Congressman Pete Stark), available at
http://www.house.gov/stark/documents/106th/medikidssumm.html.
16. Administrator Health Care Financing Administration on the Children’s
Health Insurance Program Before the Senate Finance Comm., 106th Cong. (1999)
[hereinafter Senate Finance] (testimony of Nancy-Ann Deparle), available at
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Under SCHIP, the federal government gives a portion or full
coverage to states to provide healthcare coverage to uninsured
children who are: 1) not eligible for Medicare, 2) under age nineteen,
and 3) in families where household income is at or below 200% of the
Federal Poverty Level or a percentage not higher than fifty points
above the state Medicaid eligibility requirements.17 Family coverage,
including prenatal care, was also available to parents meeting the
income requirements if the states sought and were granted a waiver
from the Secretary of Health and Human Services.18 The statute
outlines that the states may provide SCHIP coverage through an
expanded Medicaid program, a state created health insurance
program, or “a combination of both.”19 Currently, every state and
territory has a SCHIP plan with twenty-one states operating Medicaid
expansion programs, sixteen states conducting separate SCHIP
programs, and nineteen states operating combination plans.20
Experts credit SCHIP with turning the trend of increasing rates of
uninsured children around and providing much needed health
insurance to previously uninsured children.21 Since its enactment,
SCHIP has provided insurance coverage for millions of children.22 It
began slowly with states covering 982,000 children in 1998, but
quickly evolved to covering nearly 4.6 million children under SCHIP
at some point during 2001.23 While its rapid expansion created
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/media/press/testimony.asp?Counter=565.
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 1397jj, (subch. XXI) (1997) (defining the requirements for
eligibility for “targeted low-income children” under SCHIP); see also THE 2002 HHS
POVERTY GUIDELINES: ONE VERSION OF THE [U.S.] FEDERAL POVERTY MEASURE
(establishing the 2002 Federal Poverty Level for a family of four as $36,300), available
at http://www.aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/02poverty.htm (last updated Sept. 11, 2003).
18. See 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a)(1) (subch. XI) (1997) (outlining the circumstances
in which waivers may be granted).
19. Id. at § 1397aa(a)(1)-(2).
20. JENNIFER M. RYAN, SCHIP TURNS FIVE: TAKING STOCK, MOVING AHEAD 2 (2002),
available at http://www.njpf.org/pdfs_ib_IB781_SCHIP5_8-15-02.pdf; see also CTRS.
FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., STATE CHILD HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAM PLAN
ACTIVITY MAP, at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/schip/chip-map-asp (last visited Aug. 13,
2002).
21. See Robert J. Mills, Health Insurance Coverage: 2001: Consumer Income
(Sept. 2002) (noting that the actual number of uninsured children below the age of
eighteen did not change between 2000 and 2001), available at http://www.census.
gov/prod/2002pubs/p60-220.pdf.
22. See RYAN, supra note 20, at 3 (illustrating the strong growth trend in the
number of children enrolled in SCHIP).
23. See Senate Finance, supra note 16 (describing the upward trend in SCHIP’s
enrollment); see also CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., THE STATE CHILDREN’S
HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAM ANNUAL ENROLLMENT REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2001:
OCTOBER 1, 2000-SEPTEMBER 30, 2001 (highlighting a 38% increase in the number of
children enrolled in SCHIP during fiscal year 2001), available at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/schip/schip01.pdf.
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health care coverage for many, a 2002 study showed that
approximately five million children who were eligible for SCHIP
coverage were still not enrolled.24
Despite its success in providing health care coverage to the children
of the working poor and the need to continue to expand the program
to the millions of eligible children still not enrolled, SCHIP funding
and thus coverage is scheduled to decline in the future.25 When
Congress enacted SCHIP, it provided $4.3 billion for the years 19982001, but as part of the budget balancing act, Congress decreased
funding for the following years to $3.15 billion.26 This decrease in
funding comes at a time when many states are also facing the worst
budget shortfalls since World War II and having to limit their own
funding of low income health programs such as Medicaid.27
Currently, the states contribute about 30% of the SCHIP funding and
the federal government contributes the remaining 70%.28 The
SCHIP dip and state budget woes are causing many states to cut back
on their SCHIP programs and creating crisis situations in other
areas.29
The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities notes that due to the
26% reduction in federal SCHIP monies and increasing SCHIP
enrollments, twenty states will be unable to maintain their current
enrollments.30 The Office of Management and Budget has estimated
that as many as 900,000 children will no longer be covered due to the
24. See New Data, supra note 12 (noting that the enrollment of children in
SCHIP and Medicaid for health insurance coverage would decrease by one-half the
number of uninsured children in the U.S.).
25. See RYAN, supra note 20, at 4 (documenting the 26% decrease in federal
funding available to states between 2002 and 2004).
26. See id. (raising the possibility that the SCHIP dip could result in
approximately one million children losing their SCHIP coverage).
27. Robert Pear, States Are Facing Big Fiscal Crisis, Governor’s Report, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 26, 2002, at A1 (reporting that unclaimed federal funds allocated to the
states were reverted back to the Treasury Department, resulting in a $1.2 billion loss
to states for health insurance coverage for children covered by SCHIP).
28. See Press Release, United States Department of Health and Human Services,
States May Provide SCHIP Coverage For Prenatal Care, New Rule to Expand Health
Care Coverage for Babies, Mothers (Sept. 27, 2002) [hereinafter Press Release]
(referring to SCHIP’s $40 billion budget), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/
press/2002pres/20020927a.html.
29. See infra section IV(A).
30. See EDWIN PARK ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, OMB
ESTIMATES THAT 900,000 CHILDREN WILL LOSE HEALTH INSURANCE FUNDING DUE TO
REDUCTIONS IN FEDERAL SCHIP FUNDING: CONGRESS COULD EXTEND THE AVAILABILITY
OF EXPIRING SCHIP FUNDS AND UNDO THE REDUCTION IN SCHIP FUNDING LEVELS TO
AVERT A LARGE ENROLLMENT DECLINE 4-7 (2002) (drawing attention to the likelihood
of future state SCHIP spending exceeding state and federal funding), available at
http://www.cbpp.org/7-15-02health.pdf.
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decreased funding.31 For example, Oklahoma, faced by severe
budget shortfalls, has greatly reduced the number of SCHIP eligible
children in the state by changing the eligibility requirements from as
much as 185% above the federal poverty level to 115%.32
Another $1.6 billion33 to $2.8 billion in unspent federal funds
reverted back to the United States Treasury at the end of 2003.34 This
reversion occurred because SCHIP requires a state to use its allotment
of federal funding within three years and, if any money remains
unused, the funds are reallocated to states that already used their
allotments.35 Any money left over after one more year returns to the
Treasury.36 Texas, for example, relinquished more than $285 million
to other states because it could not afford to contribute its part of the
funding.37 In an attempt to alleviate the funding shortfall, Congress
has introduced several bills over the last few years to provide prenatal
and postpartum services to women and children, including immigrant
children and optional care, however, none of the measures has
passed.38 Thus, the Bush administration’s decision to expand SCHIP
coverage to unborn children increases the number of eligible
31. See id. at 11 (arguing that returning expired funds to the states and providing
full federal funding will enable many states to avoid this drop in SCHIP enrollment).
32. See IRIS J. LAW, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, STATE FISCAL
CONDITIONS CONTINUE TO DETERIORATE, FEDERAL ASSISTANCE BADLY NEEDED 2 (2002)
(stating that, because of the reduction in SCHIP eligible children, “these changes
nearly eliminate Oklahoma’s SCHIP program”), available at http://www.cbpp.org/920-02sfp.pdf.
33. See Amy Goldstein, Children’s Health Plan at Center of Dispute, Rules May
Forces States to Drop Enrollees, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2002, at A33 (addressing the
fact that this is part of a general funding problem with SCHIP, as states began their
SCHIP programs with a significant abundance of funding and are now facing budget
deficits because of the rapid increase in the number of enrollees in their programs).
34. See ROSENBACH ET AL., supra note 13, at 5 (finding that these much needed
funds were unused due to several factors, generally revolving around issues states had
in implementing their programs).
35. See id. (noting another problem with SCHIP’s funding structure, which has
created SCHIP’s budget shortfall).
36. See id. (explaining the reason for the billion dollar return of funds to the
Treasury Department).
37. See Karen Masterson, Texas Loses Millions in Health Care Funds: Other
States to Receive Unused Money, [corrected Oct. 17, 2002], HOUSTON CHRON., Oct.
16, 2002, at A1 (finding that because Texas did not use all of its funds, its portion of
SCHIP funding between 2002 and 2004 diminished by $200 million).
38. See Start Healthy, Stay Healthy Act of 2003, S. 1033, 108th Cong. (2003)
(providing states with the opportunity to increase coverage of “certain women” and
children); see also Immigrant Children’s Health Improvement Act of 2001, S. 582,
107th Cong. (2001) (stating as its primary purpose the coverage of “certain legal
immigrants,” including pregnant women and children); Mothers and Newborns
Health Insurance Act of 2001, H.R. 2610, 107th Cong. (2001) (advocating “coverage
of pregnancy related assistance for targeted low-income pregnant women,” and
“automatic enrollment of children” whose mothers receive such assistance).
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recipients under SCHIP at a time when there is not enough state or
federal funding to cover the currently eligible recipients.39
II. REDEFINING CHILD
A. The New Regulation
On September 27, 2002, less than six weeks prior to the pivotal
November 6, 2002 election where Republicans retained control of the
House and regained control of the Senate, HHS Secretary Tommy G.
Thompson first announced the new SCHIP definition of child to
include “an individual under the age of 19 including the period from
conception to birth.”40 Conception is typically deemed the moment
when a male reproductive cell, the sperm, unites with the female
reproductive cell, the egg.41 Once the fertilized cell divides, it is
called an embryo until the eighth week when it is called a fetus.42
Thus, this new definition characterizes fertilized eggs, embryos, and
fetuses as children.43 The new rule was published in the Federal
Register on October 2, 2002 and came into effect on November 1,
2002.44
While announcing the change, Thompson stated that “Prenatal
care is one of the most important investments that we can make to
ensure the long-term good health of our children and their
mothers.”45 Some hailed the change as intended to assist pregnant
low-income women46 while others saw it as a thinly veiled attempt to
begin building a legal case to overturn Roe v. Wade.47

39. See Miller, supra note 5, at 2A (noting that if the state must enroll more
children, it will require additional funding).
40. See Press Release, supra note 28, at http://hhs.gov.news.press.2002pres/
20020927a.html.
41. J.E. SCHMIDT, ATTORNEY’S DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE AND WORD FINDER Z-17, Vol.
6, (2000).
42. See id. at E-67 and F-62.
43. See Press Release, supra note 28, at (incorporating conception in the
definition of childhood).
44. See Program, supra note 1, at 61,956 (explaining the reason for expanding
the definition of child).
45. See Press Release, supra note 28.
46. See Vicki Kemper, The Nation White House Issues Regulation That Defines
Fetuses as Children, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2002, at A23 (mentioning the National
Right to Life Committees’ support for the new rule).
47. See Joan Ryan, Pre-emptive Strike on Roe vs. Wade, THE S.F. CHRON., Oct. 1,
2002, at A17; see also Pear, supra note 27, at A13 (mentioning Roe and the
disapproval of Planned Parenthood regarding the regulation).
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The controversy is fueled because rather than simply extending the
SCHIP program to provide prenatal care to eligible women, this
regulation actually takes on the very definition of child, and as such
the much debated question of when life begins and what rights the
unborn possesses.48 Furthermore, by providing care for the fetus as a
separate entity from the pregnant woman, the new definition gives
individual status and rights to the unborn child, which brings the
unborn child closer to the status of a person. If the unborn are
persons, then they should be entitled to the full panoply of legal
rights guaranteed by the Constitution. This goal of slowly gaining
personhood for the unborn as an attack on abortion rights, as
outlined by Roe, was acknowledged by Samuel B. Casey, Executive
Director of the anti-abortion group of the Christian Legal Society,
when he stated: “In as many areas as we can, we want to put on the
books that the embryo is a person. That sets the stage for a jurist to
acknowledge that human beings at any stage of development deserve
protection, even protection that would trump a woman’s interest in
terminating a pregnancy.”49 This tactic is clearly consistent with
Supreme Court statements regarding what it will take for the Court to
go beyond the doctrine of stare decisis and overrule Roe.50
B. Judicial Treatment of the Unborn
For centuries, judges and legislators struggled to define what rights
the unborn possess. This struggle has led to variations in the legal
status of the unborn from “jurisdiction to jurisdiction, from context to
context.”51 Courts and legislatures have considered such weighty
issues as whether the mother and unborn child are one or two
entities, and whether standing to sue should be based on whether the
injury occurred before or after viability or only when followed by a live
birth.
Originally, under the common law, unborn children “were not
given any rights until birth.”52 In 1884, Justice Oliver Wendell

48. See Erin P. George, Comment, The Stem Cell Debate: The Legal, Political
and Ethical Issues Surrounding Federal Funding of Scientific Research on Human
Embryos, 12 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 747, 748 (2002) (noting that “people have been
grappling with the legal, ethical and moral issues surrounding human embryos since
early English common law”).
49. Aaron Zitner, Abortion Foes Attack Rose on New Research, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
19, 2003, at A1.
50. See infra section III(B) and accompanying notes.
51. BONNIE STEINBECK, LIFE BEFORE BIRTH: THE MORAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF
EMBRYOS AND FETUSES 4 (1992).
52. See George, supra note 48 at 759.
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Holmes relied on the lack of common law precedent, the remoteness
of the injury to a fetus, and the fact that the unborn child was still a
part of its mother to hold that there was no duty of care owed to an
unborn child for wrongful death.53 Laws were later changed to allow
unborn children to have some rights, based on injuries or bequests
made while they were in utero and were subsequently born alive.
However, they still did not possess the right to an action in civil
court.54
Today, courts in over thirty-six states and the District of Columbia
allow wrongful death actions for stillborn children where the injuries
occur after viability.55 Ten state courts allow recovery in wrongful
death actions where there was a live birth.56
Two of these states denied a cause of action under the wrongful
death statutes to the representative of the unborn child, but gave the
parents a right to recover for the child’s wrongful death.57
In fact, all states, which have considered the issue, and the federal
government, allow recovery in tort for prenatal injuries if the injured
is subsequently “born alive.”58 In property law, courts have also been
willing to recognize bequests made to unborn children if the children
are subsequently born alive.59
In criminal law, courts have looked at whether the victim was born
alive in determining whether the victim sustained actionable
injuries.60 More than twenty states recognize some form of criminal

53. Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 15-17 (1884).
54. See George, supra note 48, at 760.
55. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 29 (West 1982); Endo Laboratories, Inc. v.
Hartford Ins. Group, 747 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1984) (applying California law); Walker
by Pizano v. Mart, 790 P.2d 735, 739 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (dictum in wrongful life
action); Keleman v. Superior Court, 186 Cal. Rptr. 566, 568 (Ct. App. 1982) (prenatal
injury); Paul Benjamin Linton, Planned Parenthood v. Casey: The flight From Reason
In the Supreme Court, 13 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 15, 49 (1993) (citing Wolfe v.
Isbell, 280 So. 2d 758, 761 (Ala. 1973) (express statement in context of wrongful
death action)).
56. See Stokes v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 213 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1968); Stern v. Miller,
348 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1977); Hernandez v. Garwood, 390 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 1980); Simon
v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 759, 761 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (applying Florida law);
Linton, supra note 55 at 49 (citing Justus v. Atchison, 565 P.2d 122 (Cal. 1977)).
57. See Weitl v. Moes, 311 N.W.2d 259 (Iowa 1981) (by court rule); Giardina v.
Bennett, 545 A.2d 139 (N.J. 1988) (common law).
58. See Michael Holzapfel, Comment, The Right to Live: The Right to Choose,
and the Unborn Victims of Violence Act, 18 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 431, 447
(2002); see also United States v. Spencer, 839 F.2d 1341, 1343 (9th Cir. 1988).
59. See, e.g., In re Will of Holthausen, 26 N.Y.S.2d 140, 143 (1941); see also
Cowles v. Cowles, 13 A. 414, 417 (Conn. 1887).
60. See Holzapfel, supra note 58, at 433-34.
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liability for injuries sustained in the womb.61 For example, if a child,
born alive, dies from injuries sustained while in the womb, some states
allow homicide actions.62 However, absent an expression of legislative
intent to do otherwise, thirty-three state courts have held that an
unborn child is not a “person,” “human being,” or an “other” under
their states’ murder, vehicular homicide, and manslaughter statutes.63
Courts have been willing to recognize legal rights for injuries and
bequests made to the unborn, but such rights are typically contingent
upon the unborn child successfully entering this world. No courts
claimed to base these rights on the status of the unborn as a person in
their own right prior to birth.
In addition to the born-alive rule, courts also rely on the issue of
viability in determining standing to sue in civil suits on behalf of the
unborn.64 Courts have defined viability as the time when there is “a
reasonable likelihood of the fetus’ sustained survival outside the
womb, with or without artificial support.”65 Fetuses typically reach
viability between the twenty-fourth and twenty-eighth week of
gestation.66 The Bonbrest v. Katz opinion in 1946, was the first time a
federal court held that a fetus was a separate entity from the pregnant
woman, and should have standing to sue in its own right. 67 Bonbrest
held that at viability the fetus has all the characteristics of a human
being and thus should be entitled to the full panoply of civil rights.68
Thus, the evolving law provides fetuses with property rights, wrongful
death claims, the protection of criminal laws, and the right to sue in
civil courts if they were born alive or reached the point of viability.69
In 1973, however, the Supreme Court decided what was to be the
benchmark for all laws and cases to come involving the unborn in the
abortion case of Roe vs. Wade.70
61. See id.
62. See Sandra L. Smith, Note, Fetal Homicide: Woman or Fetus as Victim? A
Survey of Current State Approaches and Recommendations for Further State
Applications, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1845, 1851 (2000).
63. See Linton, supra note 55, at 58 (citing Vo v. Sup. Ct., 836 P.2d 408, 416
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1992), and the cases cited therein). Recently, one of the cases cited in
Vo in support of the born-alive rule, State v. Harbert, 758 P.2d 826 (Okla. Crim. App.
1988) was overruled by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals in Hughes v. State,
868 P.2d 730 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994), thus reducing the number of jurisdictions that
follow the born-alive rule to thirty-two. Id.
64. See George, supra note 48, at 761.
65. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 388 (1979).
66. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973).
67. 65 F. Supp. 138, 140 (D.D.C. 1946).
68. Id. at 141.
69. See George, supra note 48, at 761.
70. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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In Roe, the Supreme Court noted the disagreement among
theologians, philosophers, and doctors regarding the point at which
life begins,71 and held that, although the state has an interest in
protecting the potential life a fetus represents in the third trimester of
pregnancy, a fetus is not a person entitled to constitutional
protections.72 In fact, the Court noted that if a fetus is a person then
the appellant’s case “collapses.”73 The Roe decision developed the
trimester approach by holding that in the first two trimesters, the
woman’s right to privacy outweighs the state’s interest in the potential
life the unborn child represents.74 In the third trimester, however,
states can regulate or prohibit abortion except in cases where the
woman’s life is in danger, because the Court found that the state’s
interest in the potential life is very strong, but not stronger than the
existing life of the mother.75 Thus, the interest of the life in being,
the pregnant woman, is always paramount to the potential life of the
unborn child.
Nearly two decades later, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, a more
conservative Court weakened the Roe ruling by substituting an
“undue burden test” for the trimester approach established in Roe,
but still did not claim that a fetus is a child or a person entitled to
constitutional protection.76 On the contrary, the majority opinion
underlined the view that the unborn are not legally deemed persons
until after birth, when it noted that Roe clearly speaks to the state’s
interest in “potential” life.77 The Court specifically relied on the
doctrine of stare decisis, the need to follow and respect precedent, in
not overruling Roe despite the anticipation that the Court would use
the opportunity presented in Casey to overturn Roe.78 However, the
Court in Casey noted that certain circumstances, including “whether
facts have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have
robbed the old rule of significant application or justification” would
warrant the overruling of prior cases.79 At that time, the Court did
71. See id. at 156 (holding that the judiciary is also not in a position to decide
when life begins).
72. See id. at 158-59.
73. See id. at 156-57.
74. See id at 162-65 (allowing the state, during the second trimester, to regulate
abortion procedures that promote maternal health).
75. See id. at 162-65 (finding that a woman’s right to privacy is not absolute).
76. 505 U.S. 833, 873-74 (1992) (concluding that the trimester framework was not
part of Roe’s essential holding).
77. Id. at 871.
78. See id. at 853 (citing also to a woman’s “individual liberty” to uphold the
central holding of Roe).
79. Id. at 854-55.
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not find such a determinative change in facts to exist.80 Thus, in
order to justify overruling Roe, abortion opponents would need to
show a change in facts meriting overturning the Court’s previous
decision.
In 1975, the Supreme Court in Burns v. Alcala,81 reinforced the
precedent that the unborn are not children when it used a plain
meaning approach and held that the term “dependent child” as used
in the Social Security Act82 does not include unborn children.83
Thus, while courts have afforded the unborn various levels of rights
and protections in the areas of criminal law, property law,
constitutional law, and tort law, these rights have been based on the
potential life the unborn represents or subsequently achieves, and not
by elevating the unborn to the same status as living children. 84 At
most, the Supreme Court recognizes that states have an interest in the
potential life of a fetus, but no such protected interest has been
provided for a fertilized egg or an embryo.
If the Bush
Administration simply wanted to extend SCHIP benefits to the
unborn without making a political statement, it could have extended
coverage to fetuses and embryos rather than redefining “child.”
C. Legislative Treatment of the Unborn
State and federal legislators have also grappled with what rights to
afford the unborn. Their struggles are not reflected by the lack of a
comprehensive treatment of the unborn, but rather the varying
recognition of rights on a state-by-state, area-by-area, basis.85 Under
traditional tort law, neither the fetus nor its family could maintain a
cause of action for injuries suffered in utero.86 Today, however, a
majority of states have statutes that include children injured in utero
as “persons” for purposes of their wrongful death statutes.87 In
80. See id. at 860 (determining that despite some factual changes since Roe, such
as an earlier point of viability due to medical advances, the changes have no bearing
on the validity of the central holding of Roe).
81. 420 U.S. 575, 578 (1975).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 602 (West 2003).
83. 420 U.S. at 578.
84. See Linton, supra note 55, at 64 (noting that courts have used Roe to reject
civil rights claims of the unborn under 42 U.S.C. §1983).
85. See generally Kayhan Parsi, Metaphorical Imagination: The Moral and Legal
Status of Fetuses and Embryos, 4 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 703 (1999) (discussing
the process of various state and federal legislators in granting rights to unborn
children).
86. See, e.g., Justus v. Atchison, 565 P.2d 122, 131 (Cal. 1977) (denying tort
recovery of stillborn fetus for wrongful death).
87. Mamta K. Shah, Inconsistencies in the Legal Status of an Unborn Child:

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol12/iss1/4

12

Sperow: Redefining Child under the State Children's Health Insurance Prog
SPEROW.DOC

2004]

4/23/2004 1:30 PM

REDEFINING CHILD UNDER SCHIP

149

addition, fourteen states recognize unborn children as victims under
their homicide laws throughout the gestation period,88 and one-third
of the states have statutes, which make it a homicide to kill an unborn
child regardless of the stage of pregnancy.89 Other states, such as
Arkansas, have redefined “person” under their homicide laws to
include a fetus beyond twelve weeks of conception,90 and some states,
such as Louisiana, have gone so far as to recognize life as beginning at
conception.91 States have also attempted to use tort law to restrict
abortion rights by prohibiting claims for wrongful birth actions.92
Thus, treatment of the unborn by the state legislatures ranges from
recognizing conception as the beginning of life to providing limited
rights to the unborn.
The United States Congress has addressed the treatment of the
unborn. Congress has prohibited federal funding for research
involving non-viable fetuses or fetuses whose viability is not yet
ascertained, unless the research will enhance the health or well-being
of the fetus.93 Recently, the House of Representatives debated the
“Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004”, House Bill 1997, which it
passed on February 26, 2004.94 The Senate, which had failed to vote
on the Bill twice before when introduced in previous years, also
passed the Bill on March 25, 2004.95 The law, dubbed “Laci and
Conner’s Law,”96 creates a separate federal crime for any injury or
death caused to an unborn child by a third party while committing a
Recognition of a Fetus as Potential Life, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 931, 939 (2001).
88. These states include: Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN §13-11-03 (West 1989)),
Idaho (IDAHO CODE §18-4001(2002)), and Illinois (ILL. ANN. STAT. CH. 38 ¶9-1.2, ¶92.1,¶9-3.2 (Smith-Hurd 2003)).
89. See Linton, supra note 55, at 60.
90. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-102(13)(B)(i)(a)(b) (2003).
91. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 26 (West 1999).
92. See generally A.J. Stone, III, Article, Tort Law as an End Run Around
Abortion Rights After Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y &
L. 471 (2000) (discussing two states’ legislation prohibiting wrongful birth claims).
93. 42 U.S.C. § 289g (2003).
94. H.R. 1997, 108th Cong., 2d Sess. (2004). The House passed this bill twice
previously, in 1999 and 2001. See H.R. 503, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. (2001). However,
the Senate never acted on the 1999 and 2001 bills. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Washington
Talk: From CNN to Congress, Legislation by Anecdote, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2003, at
A26.
95. Senate Passes Unborn Victims Bill, FOX NEWS CHANNEL, March 26, 2004,
(reporting that the Senate passed the identical bill that the House passed), available
at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,115189,00.html.
96. See H.R. 1997 (noting the short title of the Bill); see also Senate Passes
Unborn Victims Bill, supra note 95 (explaining the Bill was named after Laci
Peterson, a California woman who was murdered and her unborn son, who was to be
named Conner).
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federal offense against the pregnant woman.97 This bill, like other
“feticide” laws, was intended to punish those who cause great harm or
death to unborn children.98 Importantly, this law grants the unborn
child the same status as living children by making it a separate offense
for harm to the child in utero.99
Until the recent passage of the Unborn Victims of Violence Act of
2004, legal and legislative precedent is clear that any protections or
rights the unborn have are predicated on their status as potential life
and not as existing children.100 HHS’s decision to include the
unborn as children is a bold step into the much debated question of
when life begins, and may very well be one of a series of calculated
steps geared to changing the way our government, our country, and
our courts consider and treat the unborn. The Court in Roe
specifically referenced the lack of agreement among theologians,
philosophers and doctors regarding when life begins in devising their
trimester approach. In fact, the Court specifically noted that if the
fetus is a person, the case would have been decided differently.101
Thus, HHS’s changing the definition of child, in the medical
insurance arena no less, to include the unborn could be just the type
of evidence the Casey Court indicated it would need to find; “a
change in facts;” warranting the decision that life begins at
conception and therefore justifying the overturning of Roe.
III. WHY THE NEW DEFINITION FAILS TO ACHIEVE THE STATED GOALS
In addition to entering the controversial debate regarding when life
begins, the expansion of SCHIP coverage without providing
additional funding is doomed to fail for economic and practical
97. See Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-212, §
1841(a)(1), 118 Stat. 568 (2004) (signed into law by President Bush on April 1,
2004).
98. See 150 CONG. REC. S3125 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 2004) (statement of Sen.
DeWine) (stating that the Bill is about “simple justice” by “recognize[ing] when
someone attacks and harms a mother and her unborn child that attack does in fact
result in two separate victims: the mother and her child.”).
99. See Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004 § 1841(a)(1) .
100. Critics of the Unborn Victims of Violence Act note that this law could have
serious implications on women’s rights. Senator Feinstein of California, who
authored an amendment that was defeated keeping an attack on a pregnant woman a
single-victim offense, stated, “If this result is incorporated, it will be the first step in
removing a woman’s right to choice.” Senate Passes Unborn Victims Bill, supra note
95. But see Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004 § 1841(c)(1)-(2) (expressly
stating that the provisions of the law do not apply to abortion by consent or to any
medical treatment to the pregnant woman or her unborn child).
101. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156-57 (1973) (noting that considering the
fetus as a person would defeat Roe’s claim, as the fetus’ life would then be protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment).
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reasons. The bleak economic situation, which is facing the federal
SCHIP funding and the state budgets, in combination with SCHIP’s
awkward configuration pitting the interests of the women against their
unborn children, creates a bind for states seeking to expand prenatal
care.
A. Lack of Funding Will Prevent Meaningful Expansion of SCHIP
Benefits to Include Unborn Children
As discussed in Section II, the expansion of the definition of “child”
to cover the unborn comes at a time when, due to economic woes,
almost every state is in “fiscal crisis.”102 In fact, the National
Governor’s Association stated that “state budgets are in their worst
shape since WWII.”103 Under this crisis situation, many states must
restrict their current SCHIP coverage.104 Thus, even if the intent of
the change was to increase the number of people eligible for coverage
under SCHIP, due to state budget shortfalls and federal reductions in
matching funds, it is unlikely that many states will actually be able to
expand their coverage to include prenatal care. Sharon Carte,
director of West Virginia’s SCHIP program, noted that the new
regulation will not help cover any pregnant women in West Virginia
because the state’s spending is already stretched as far as it can go
trying to cover the previously eligible children.105
Representatives of the SCHIP programs in New Hampshire,
Vermont, Connecticut, and Massachusetts, share Carte’s belief that
due to tight constraints on the state budgets this change will not
increase coverage.106 Lori Real, the Medicaid director in New
Hampshire’s Department of Health and Human Services, pointed out
that states would need to come up with about 35% of their own funds
to expand their SCHIP coverage to include unborn children,
something they cannot do under current budget constraints.107
Some states, such as Texas, are already facing a funding gap in SCHIP
102. Robert Tanner, Republican Governors Lament Lag in Security: Needs are
Pressing, but Funds Limited, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 24, 2002, at A11.
103. Eun-Kyung Kim, States Face Bleakest Budgets in Decades; Many Legislatures
are Turning to Tax Increases to Replenish Depleted Coffers, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov.
26, 2002, at A4.
104. Oklahoma, facing severe budget shortfalls, has greatly reduced the number of
SCHIP eligible children in the state by changing the eligibility requirements from
185% above the federal poverty level to 115%. See LAW, supra note 32, at 2.
105. See Miller, supra note 5, at P2A (noting that the state will have to use unused
funds from previous years to meet its coverage needs for 20,000 enrolled children).
106. Jim Geraghty, State Health Care Providers Doubt Big Changes From Bush
Prenatal Care Proposal, States News Service, October 2, 2002.
107. See id.
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coverage in the tens of millions of dollars just trying to cover the
previously eligible children.108 Citing budget deficits, ex-California
Governor Gray Davis vetoed a $50 million item in the 2003 California
state budget to extend California’s SCHIP coverage to 300,000 lowincome parents.109
Other states noted that this change in the definition of “child” is
unlikely to increase coverage in their states because they already had
programs in place to provide prenatal care.110 Thus, by not creating
any new funding for SCHIP, this change creates the potential for new
members to a program that is already at the breaking point.
B. HHS’s Change in its Regulation Creates a Conflict of Interest
Between the Woman and her Unborn Child
Even if funding were available in some states to increase the SCHIP
program to cover unborn children, the new regulation sets up a
conflict of interest between the pregnant woman and her unborn
child, which may prevent women from seeking coverage under the
program and also may inhibit a physician’s ability to provide proper
care. HHS was clear in its proclamation that the coverage extends to
the unborn child only, not to the pregnant woman, unless she is
under age nineteen and thus also considered a child.111 The
irrationality of this selective coverage is emphasized by the fact that
HHS expressly stated that the pregnant woman is not entitled to
coverage for any care after the birth of the child.112 Therefore, as
soon as the child enters the world, the woman is on her own. Thus,
the patient to whom the doctor owes his or her duty of care is clearly
the unborn child and not the pregnant woman. This situation begs
the question: how are doctors to treat the unborn child without also
treating the pregnant woman? This may not be a problem in areas
where the pregnant woman acquiesces to the doctor’s recommended
prenatal treatment; but how are doctors to behave when the interests
of the pregnant woman and the interests of the unborn child conflict,

108. Gary Susswein, Texas Budget Facing Strain of Foster Care; Additional $62
Million Needed as Bad News Buffets State’s Finances, AUSTIN-AM.-STATESMAN, Jan. 30,
2002, at B1 (reporting that Texas’ need for additional funding will increase its
payments nearly 9%).
109. Pear, supra note 27, at A1.
110. See Geraghty, supra note 106.
111. See 67 Fed. Reg. 61,956 (2002) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 457) (stating that
“while a pregnant woman under age 19 could be eligible as a targeted low-income
child and benefit, a pregnant woman over age 19 would not”).
112. See id. at 61,969 (stating that coverage is only available “during the period
from conception to birth”).
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or the woman wishes to pursue an alternate plan of treatment or
forego treatment altogether?
The law is unclear on this point. Although it is well established that
a competent adult has the right to refuse medical treatment, when
that competent adult is a pregnant woman, the law becomes less
clear.113 In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, the
Supreme Court relied on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to hold that an individual has a right to preserve his or
her own bodily integrity by avoiding an unwanted medical
procedure.114 This right has cultivated the doctrine of informed
consent, which means that doctors must inform their patients of all
risks associated with contemplated procedures and then give the
patient the option of having or not having the procedure.115 Justice
Cardozo articulated the strength of this right: “Every human being of
adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be
done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation
without his patient’s consent committed an assault for which he is
liable in damages.”116
The Supreme Court has also held that a woman does not relinquish
her right to personal autonomy when she becomes pregnant.117 In
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists,118 the Supreme Court held that a Pennsylvania statute
which forced a trade-off between the pregnant woman’s health and
the survival of the fetus was unconstitutional.119 Similarly, in a recent
decision, Ferguson v. City of Charleston, a case involving a law aimed
at preventing substance abuse among pregnant women, the Supreme
Court ruled that the interests of women not to be subject to
unreasonable searches and seizures outweighed the interests of the
state in protecting unborn children from the pregnant woman’s

113. See generally Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 262
(1990) (holding that “an incompetent person” is “unable to make an informed and
voluntary choice to exercise” the right to refuse such treatment); see also Bradley J.
Glass, A Comparative Analysis of the Right of a Pregnant Woman to Refuse Medical
Treatment for Herself and Her Viable Fetus: The United States and The United
Kingdom, 11 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 507, 509 (2001) (commenting that British
courts “operate on the legal principle that each individual’s body is inviolate unless
the individual consents [to a medical procedure]”).
114. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281.
115. Alan Meisel et al., Toward a Model of the Legal Doctrine of Informed
Consent, 134 AM. J. PSYCH. 285, 286-87 (1977).
116. Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. App. Div. 1914).
117. See Glass, supra note 113, at 512.
118. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
119. Id. at 768-69.
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substance abuse.120 In Ferguson, the Court addressed a conflict of
interest between the pregnant woman and her unborn child and held
that the pregnant woman’s constitutional right under the Fourth
Amendment to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures is more
important than the need to protect unborn children from the
pregnant woman’s drug addiction.121 These rulings seem to indicate
that the woman’s interest shall trump the state’s interest when
medical decisions are at issue.
In addition, there are no state laws providing courts with
jurisdiction to hear cases where a pregnant woman refuses to undergo
medical treatments, even when her refusal may jeopardize the wellbeing of the fetus.122 All states currently have laws preventing child
abuse and neglect, however, and the applicability of these laws to
actions taken by a pregnant woman would hinge on whether the fetus
is classified as a child.123 Some states, such as New Jersey, have
expressly incorporated a fetus as covered by their child abuse laws.124
Thus, the question remains whether foregoing recommended
prenatal medical treatment could be actionable child abuse or
neglect.
Despite the lack of jurisdiction to hear such cases, doctors have
successfully obtained court intervention in order to subject a pregnant
woman to a medical procedure which she has objected to but the
doctor believed to be in the best interests of the unborn child.125 In
fact, the Kolder study done in 1987, found that in twenty-one cases
where court orders were sought to override the wishes of the pregnant
woman on behalf of the fetus, the orders were granted in 86%
(seventeen) of the cases.126
There are two main schools of thought concerning court ordered
medical intervention over the objections of the pregnant woman.
The first school, the majority approach, claims to give absolute
120. 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
121. Id. at 82-86.
122. Pamela Harris, Note, Compelled Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women:
The Balancing of Maternal and Fetal Rights, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 133, 150 (2001)
(arguing that the law should honor a pregnant woman’s refusal of medical treatment
because it is a more ethical and legally appropriate alternative).
123. See id.
124. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §30:4-11 (West 1981).
125. See Veronika E.B. Kolder et al., Court-Ordered Obstetrical Interventions, 316
NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 1192, 1192 (1987) (finding that typically this has been done
regarding cesarean sections); see generally Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Hosp. v.
Anderson, 201 A.2d 537 (N.J. 1964) (ordering a blood transfusion despite the
pregnant woman’s religious objections).
126. See Kolder et al., supra note 125, at 1192.
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deference to a woman’s choice regarding health care.127 The other
school, the minority view, balances the rights of the pregnant woman
against those of the fetus and when treatment is deemed beneficial to
both or not too intrusive for the pregnant woman, is ordered by the
Court.128
The American Medical Association has noted that in no other
circumstance is a patient forced to undergo medical treatments for
the benefit of another129 and recommends that courts honor the
pregnant woman’s choice unless there are exceptional
circumstances.130 It is unclear, however, exactly what would be an
exceptional circumstance. Even courts subscribing to the majority
view, however, have ordered medical intervention over a woman’s
wishes where the court found the procedure not to be too invasive.
Such court-ordered “non-invasive” procedures have included cesarean
sections or blood transfusions over the pregnant woman’s objections
when the doctor believed the procedure to be in the best interests of
the unborn child.131 If abdominal surgery is considered “noninvasive,” it is difficult to imagine what some courts would exclude. In
addition, the court has ordered a pregnant woman to be held in
custody in a prison hospital facility until after the birth of the child to
ensure delivery of the child in a manner the court considered
appropriate132 and also ordered a woman dying of cancer to
prematurely deliver a baby over her objections.133 The Supreme
127. See Glass, supra note 113, at 522 (comparing the rights of pregnant women to
maintaining her own bodily integrity with the interests of the state).
128. See id. at 526-27.
129. See H.M. Cole, Legal Intervention during Pregnancy: Court-Ordered Medical
Treatment and Legal Penalties for Potentially Harmful Behavior by Pregnant Women,
264 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2663, 2664 (1990).
130. See Glass, supra note 113, at 521-22.
131. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457
(Ga. 1981) (ordering Caesarian section over objections of mother who opposed
operation and blood transfusions on religious grounds); In re Jamaica Hosp., 491
N.Y.S.2d 898 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (holding that the woman’s interest in exercising
her religious beliefs was not enough to override the interests of the state in protecting
the fetus); Crouse v. Irving Memorial Hosp., Inc., 485 N.Y.S.2d 443 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1985) (allowing the hospital to administer a blood transfusion to the mother and
child against the mother’s objections); Cole, supra note 129; Kolder et al., supra note
125, at 1192 (finding that typically this has been done regarding cesarean sections);
Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Hosp. v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537 (1964) (holding that a
pregnant woman must have a blood transfusion despite her religious objections).
132. Brian MacQuarrie & Richard Higgins, Attleboro Sect Member Gives Birth
State Custody Seen; Court Hearing Is Set, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 17, 2000, at B1; see
also Marilyn L. Miller, Fetal Neglect and State Intervention: Preventing Another
Attleboro Cult Baby Death, 8 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 71 (2001) (discussing the case of
Rebecca Corneau who was held in custody because she refused a prenatal medical
examination on religious grounds).
133. See generally In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990) (discussing the death of
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Court has, however, struck down laws that required a woman to accept
an increased medical risk to save a viable fetus134 and to undergo a
mini-cesarean section because it offered the best opportunity for the
fetus to be born alive.135 It is important to note that all of these cases
occurred in a context where the mother was the primary patient and
it is therefore reasonable to assume that the doctor and the court may
have a more compelling reason to intervene over the objections of the
woman than where the unborn child is the primary patient. Thus, the
current regulation places women and doctors in the awkward position
of not knowing how to proceed in a situation where the doctor may
be treating and interacting with the woman but be primarily
concerned about and interested in the unborn child. Given the lack
of clear guidance from the courts, a woman’s fear that the doctor may
order or subject her to medical procedures she does not wish to have,
but the doctor deems to be in the best interests of the unborn patient,
may be enough to prevent her from seeking the prenatal care the
revision claims to provide.136
IV. THE POLITICAL UNDERPINNINGS
President Bush made clear that the November 2002 midterm
election was a mandate on his presidency and his ability to get things
done so he heavily invested his time and energy in seeing that the
Republicans held on to their majority in the House and regained the
Senate.137 Thus the timing and place of the announcement of the
change in HHS’s definition place it right in the middle of a highly
charged political scene. A Gallup Poll conducted during the month
before the November 2002 election, found that the abortion issue was
moderately to extremely important for 70% of voters in deciding how
they would vote in the November 2002 election.138 In addition, the
Bush Administration chose to announce the change during a speech
both mother and baby within two days of the delivery procedure).
134. Thornburgh v. Am. College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
747 (1986).
135. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
136. In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1248 (D.C. 1990) (en banc), (noting that fear of
being subject to a medical procedure to which she objects may prevent a woman from
seeking the medial care she needs).
137. Bush, Cheney Raise Cash For Candidates, THE TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Oct.
15, 2002, at A3 (detailing a fundraiser in Maryland designed to gain support for
Republican Congressional candidates).
138. Roper Center at University of Connecticut Public Opinion online, “How
important will each of the following issues be to your vote for Congress this
November (2002)– will it be – extremely important, very important, moderately
important, or not that important? How about abortion?” Gallup Organization, Sept.
20-22, 2002.
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given by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, Tommy
Thompson, before the Conservative Political Action Committee as
one of several examples of the Administration’s commitment to the
unborn.139 Thus, the expanded definition was a clear reminder to
anti-abortion activists that a Republican victory was important in the
fight to overturn Roe. The new provision also expands coverage to
the unborn children of immigrants, regardless of the citizenship
status of their parents, which is seen as a political outreach to the
Hispanic vote at a time when the Republicans were attempting to woo
them for the November election.140
While providing health care for the uninsured working poor had
not been a previous priority for the Bush Administration,141
maintaining the support of the religious right and other abortion
opponents has been a clear goal.142 In keeping with his goal of
opposing abortion rights, Bush has appointed conservative pro-life
advocate John Ashcroft as Attorney General. On his first day in office
and coincidentally the 28th anniversary of Roe, President Bush issued
an executive order halting United States funding to international
family planning groups that support abortion rights.143 Redefining
children to include the unborn in the health context is another step
towards changing facts warranting an overruling of Roe. The Bush
Administration has also stated that it is deeming the unborn fetus to
be a “child.” This statement has been lauded by anti-abortion activists
and condemned by pro-choice groups.144 Thus, the timing of the
regulation combined with its effect of increasing the number of
eligible recipients in a program that is already over capacity supports
the view that it is a politically motivated change without the intention
or likelihood of providing real medical benefits.
139. See Tommy G. Thompson, Remarks at the Conservative Political Action
Committee Conference (Jan. 31, 2002) (describing changes in the Department of
Health and Human Services under the Bush Administration), available at
http://www.hhs.gov/news/speech/2002/020131.html.
140. See Times Wire Reports, Latino Voters Not of Single Mind, Poll Finds, Oct. 4,
2002, at A22 (noting that Latino voters are likely to be unpredictable when it comes
to core beliefs associated with either conservatives or liberals).
141. See Amy Goldstein, States’ Budget Woes Fuel Medicaid Cuts; Poor Lose
Coverage and Services, WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 2002, at A1 (noting that many former
welfare recipients are also losing Medicaid benefits).
142. Alexandra Starr, Enough With The Rhetoric, The Right Wants Results, BUS.
WK, Feb. 10, 2003, at 43 (noting that balancing both conservative and moderate social
goals is a priority of the Bush Administration).
143. See Swift Action by Bush, ABCNEWS.COM, Jan. 23, 2001, available at
http://abcnewsgo.com/sections/politics/DailyNews/bush-abortionrights.
144. See Ralph Ranalli, Bush Plan On Fetus Sparks Debate, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept.
30, 2002, at B3 (describing the adverse reaction to Bush’s prenatal care plan among
liberal voters in Massachusetts).
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IV. THERE ARE BETTER WAYS TO PROVIDE PRENATAL COVERAGE
Providing prenatal health insurance coverage to all pregnant
women is an important health benefit that the Bush Administration
should seek to provide. Studies link the absence of prenatal health
insurance, and thus the lack of health care, to higher infant mortality
rates.145 Currently, the United States ranks 28th in the world with an
infant mortality rate of 6.8 deaths per 1000 live births.146 There is
obviously room for improvement. Thus, HHS should seek legitimate
ways to provide prenatal health insurance coverage to those not
covered by Medicaid or private health insurance. The current action
falls short by its lack of funding and its structural problems. This
coverage could have been provided by speeding up the current waiver
program, giving more funding to the SCHIP program, preventing the
SCHIP dip, preventing the reversion to the federal treasury of the
unused SCHIP funds, or creating a new program geared specifically
toward providing prenatal care for uninsured pregnant women.
In keeping with the regulation’s provisions for providing prenatal
care, nine states had already obtained waivers from the Secretary of
HHS under Section 1115 of SCHIP, to cover parents or pregnant
women fitting the income criteria, as well as their children.147
Arizona, California (not implemented by the state but approved by
HHS), Minnesota, New Mexico, Ohio (not implemented by the State
but approved by HHS), and Wisconsin all obtained waivers from HHS
to cover parents of SCHIP recipients.148 Such family coverage, of
course, is included in prenatal care. While Colorado, New Jersey, and
Rhode Island specifically obtained permission to cover pregnant
women who are not eligible for Medicaid using SCHIP funds.149 At
the writing of this article, Arkansas and Maryland also had requests
pending with HHS to provide such coverage.150
HHS notes that the new definition of child will enable states to
cover unborn children in a few weeks or months, as opposed to the
145. See Jim Weill, The Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Well-Being
of America’s Children, 5 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY L. & POL’Y 257, 259 (1998)
(discussing American attitudes towards the needs of children).
146. Faststats Infant Deaths/Mortality, National Center for Health Statistics,
available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/infmort.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2003).
147. Andeen, supra note 12, at 324-25; State Children’s Health Insurance Program
(SCHIP), Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services CMSO, FCHPG, Division of
State Children’s Health Insurance (DSCHI) [hereinafter State Children’s], at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/schip/stateplans/waivers/1115waivers.pdf (last visited Apr.
6, 2004).
148. See State Children’s, supra note 147, at 1-4.
149. See Press Release, supra note 28.
150. See State Children’s, supra note 147, at 5-6.
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previous waiver procedure, which HHS claims could take three to six
months.151 However, the figures provided by HHS show that some
states had their waivers approved as quickly as eight days (California),
while the longest wait was five months (Minnesota).152 Eight days is a
not very long period of waiting time, and shows that HHS can process
these waivers quickly. If HHS were truly concerned about the speed
of approving the waivers, it seems that the easier solution would be
simply to implement an internal program which would allow HHS to
more quickly grant the waiver requests to states to cover pregnant
women, or to make the waiver process easier. Once the waiver is
obtained, the woman as well as the unborn child would be covered
which would eliminate the conflict of interest problems discussed
above in section II(A).
Furthermore, under the new definition of child, states must rewrite
their current programs to define the additional type of coverage, if
any, that will be available for this new subset of children. Thus, the
new regulation does not automatically provide prenatal care.
Rewriting state insurance coverage policies is hardly a quick and
simple process. Some states have already said that due to funding
shortfalls they already are unable to continue funding for the
currently covered children,153 so it is questionable whether states will
be able to cover any unborn children, and if they do, it may very well
come at the expense of older children.
In the alternative, HHS could have proposed a new program aimed
specifically at providing prenatal care to pregnant women and their
unborn children, who need it and are unable to afford it. Such a
program would need to provide its own funding, and thus would not
be competing with the already thinly stretched SCHIP funds. It would
also cover both the woman and the child, thereby avoiding a conflict
of interest problem. In addition, if the Bush Administration believes
the best option is to provide coverage under the scope of SCHIP, it
should aggressively support the bills introduced in Congress to
prevent the “SCHIP Dip,” and the return of unused funds to the
United States Treasury. Each of these suggested methods would

151. See Kemper, supra note 46, at A23, (quoting HHS spokesman Bill Pierce
stating that the new regulation extends citizenship to all children born in the U.S.
regardless of the immigration status of the mother).
152. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SRVS., STATE CHILDREN’S HEALTH INSURANCE
PROGRAM ANNUAL ENROLLMENT REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2001: OCTOBER 1, 2000-SEPTEMBER
30, 2001 (2002), at http://www.cms-hhs.gov/schip/enrollment/schip01.pdf (last
visited July 30, 2002).
153. See infra part III(A).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2004

23

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 4
SPEROW.DOC

160

4/23/2004 1:30 PM

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 12:1

provide the needed prenatal care, without entering the legal
quagmire of when life begins.
CONCLUSION
Prenatal care is an important public health benefit, which the
United States should strive to provide for all pregnant women. The
Bush Administration’s rewriting of SCHIP’s definition of child to
include fertilized eggs, embryos, and fetuses, regardless of the
pregnant woman’s immigration status, is a bold foray into the legal
quagmire of abortion rights and the question of when life begins. The
new definition further fails to provide any real steps toward improving
prenatal coverage for those who need it. The regulation’s failure to
provide additional funding, and the built-in conflict of interest
between the pregnant woman and the unborn child make it little
more than political and legal ammunition for abortion opponents to
overturn Roe, rather than a legitimate policy aimed at providing
prenatal care for women and their unborn children.
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